







1.  I would like to begin with a passage from Immanuel Kant’s essay “The Idea of 
a Universal History from a Cosmopolitical Point of View”.   
 
[It] may be hoped that when the play of the freedom of the human will is examined 
on the great scale of universal history, a regular march may be discovered in its 
movements, and that, in this way, what appears to be tangled in the case of 
individuals, will be recognised in the history of the whole species as a continually 
advancing, though slow, development of its original capacities and endowments … 
We will accordingly see whether we can succeed in finding a clue to such a history; 
and in the event of doing so, we will leave it to nature to bring forth the man who 
will compose it.  Thus did she bring forth a Kepler who, in an eccentric way, 
reduced the definite paths of the planets to definite laws; and then she brought forth 
a Newton, who explained these laws by a universal natural cause.1   
 
Here we have the vision of a person who will write what Arthur C. Danto calls a 
substantive philosophy of history.  A central aim of Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of 
History is to show that it is not possible for such a person ever to come forth.  
 Kant may be one of Danto’s targets, but, as Danto is well aware, there is 
something palpably Kantian about his own enterprise.  Just as the Transcendental 
Aesthetic and Analytic are supposed to state the conditions that make a priori knowledge 
possible, and the Transcendental Dialectic to show, in Danto’s words, “the unhappy 
destiny which attends Reason when it attempts to extend [the] forms of understanding 
                                                 
1 Trans. W. Hastie, in P. Gardiner (ed.) Theories of History (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 23.  Cited in 
Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge 3rd edition, including the integral text of Analytical Philosophy 
of History [1968] (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 3-4.   
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specified in the Analytic beyond”2 those conditions, so Analytical Philosophy of History 
is supposed to state the conditions that make ordinary historical knowledge possible, and 
to show “the unhappy destiny” that attends the substantive philosophy of history when it 
attempts to extend modes of representation beyond those conditions.  So, it comes as no 
surprise when Danto says that it is “in the spirit of critical philosophy” 3 that he wishes 
his argument to be understood.  
 The aim of this paper is to offer an assessment of – what we might call – Danto’s 
Dialectic: his attempt to show that the idea of a substantive philosophy of history is the – 
incoherent – idea of a form of historical knowledge that violates its own conditions of 
possibility.  My assessment will not be wholly positive.  But I hope it will bring to light 
aspects of Danto’s thinking that have been the objects of undeserved neglect.   
 
 
2.  Analytical Philosophy of History was published in 1968, and it does tend to 
show its philosophical age.  Its concern may be historical knowledge and its limits, but, 
as befits its time of writing, it masks that concern by continual semantic ascent, talking 
rarely of knowledge or even representation, and continually of ‘sentences’, true and 
otherwise.  But knowledge and representation are its concern,4 and its ambition is 
Kantian: to show that the very conditions that sceptically-minded philosophers treat as 
fetters on, or even as barriers to, historical knowledge, are the very conditions that make 
such knowledge possible.5   
 It ought to be uncontroversial that historians attempt to acquire knowledge of the 
past.  But, we might think, this is just to say that historians attempt to acquire knowledge 
of certain propositions, viz. propositions about events that happen to take place at a time 
                                                 
2 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 257.  
3 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 257.   
4 Danto now thinks of his earlier talk of “narrative sentences” as a kind of joke, and makes clear that his 
concern was always historical representation and historical knowledge.  See his ‘Response to Ankersmit’ in 
D. Herwitz and M. Kelly (eds.) Action, Art, History: Engagements with Arthur C. Danto (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007).   
5 The conditions in question are conditions on something’s so much as being a possible instance of 
knowledge of a certain sort.  It is possible for something to meet the conditions but not be an actual 
instance of knowledge of this sort.  But it is not possible for something to be an actual or possible instance 
of knowledge of this sort but not meet the conditions.  Conditions of this sort are examined in detail in 
Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, revised and enlarged 
edn. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).    
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anterior to that at which the historians attempt to acquire their knowledge.  Put like that, 
historians seem to be at an epistemic disadvantage.  How much better it would be if their 
attempt to acquire their knowledge could take place at the very same time as the events 
about which they are attempting to know!  Then they could make use of a genuinely 
reliable source of information: they could actually witness the events, as they happen, 
rather than relying on the necessarily unreliable sources that constitute their ordinary 
stock-in-trade.   
 In this line of thought, the fact that historians’ standpoint is future to the putative 
objects of their knowledge places a limitation on their epistemic capacity.  Perhaps the 
fact that historians have such a standpoint constitutes a barrier to historical knowledge: 
they cannot acquire knowledge of the relevant propositions, because the only way for 
them to do so would be to do what they cannot do, and witness the relevant events, as 
they happen.  Or perhaps the fact constitutes a fetter on historical knowledge: they can 
only acquire knowledge of those relevant propositions that are couched at a suitably high 
level of abstraction – <Henry VII lived sometime before the start of the 17th century > for 
example, but not <on the 22nd August 1485, Henry VII was victorious at the Battle of 
Bosworth Field> – because the only way for historians to acquire knowledge of relevant 
propositions at lower levels would be to do what they cannot do, and witness the relevant 
events, as they happen.  
 Danto’s Kantian aim is to turn the game played by the sceptic against itself, by 
showing that it is, neither a fetter on, nor a barrier to, but a condition of the possibility of 
historical knowledge that it is acquired from a standpoint future to the events it concerns.  
Historical knowledge can only be acquired from this standpoint.  Witnessing is of no 
help.  
In line with the spirit of his philosophical age, Danto introduces the idea of 
historical knowledge by reference to the kind of sentences that may be used to express it; 
what he calls narrative sentences, and characterises as follows.  
 
[The] most general characteristic [of narrative sentences] is that they refer to at 
least two time-separated events though they only describe (are only about) the 
earliest event to which they refer.  Commonly they take the past tense, and indeed it 
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would be odd … for them to take any other tense.  The fact that these sentences 
may constitute in some measure a differentiating stylistic feature of narrative 
writing is of less interest to me than the fact that use of them suggests a 
differentiating feature of historical knowledge.6   
 
‘Thatcher’s decision to withdraw the warship Endurance from the South Atlantic 
precipitated Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands’ would be an example of a 
narrative sentence.  But Danto insists that narrative sentences form a very wide class, 
whose members include, inter alia, every sentence that can be used to speak of causal 
relations.  So, ‘the striking of the match caused the lighting of the match’ would be 
another example.  The central mark of narrative sentences is that they are true only if the 
later of the two events to which they refer (the Falklands War; the lighting of the match) 
actually takes place.  In consequence, the proposition expressible by such a sentence 
cannot be known simply by witnessing the event that it is about – in Danto’s somewhat 
technical sense of ‘about’ – because knowing such a proposition requires knowing what 
happens in the future of such an event.  That is what it means to say that historians can 
only acquire historical knowledge from a standpoint future to the events about which they 
attempt to know.   
 So-called scepticism about historical knowledge is not, then, scepticism about 
historical knowledge at all, but scepticism about some other sort of knowledge, precisely 
because the sort of knowledge that this scepticism denies the historian can be acquired 
from somewhere other than the historian’s standpoint, viz. from the standpoint of 
someone who simply witnesses the relevant events, as they happen.  If scepticism about 
this other kind of knowledge is a problem for critical philosophy, it is not, Danto 
contends, a problem for the critical philosophy of history in particular.   
 
 
3.   Danto sharpens the idea of historical knowledge by way of the fantasy of the 
Ideal Witness, who is “capable of seeing all at once everything that happens, as it 
                                                 
6 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 143.  
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happens, the way it happens”.7  Danto’s point is that even though the Witness may be 
ideal qua witness, she is far from ideal qua historian, precisely because she lacks 
“knowledge of the future”.  Danto invites us to imagine a chronicle set down by the Ideal 
Witness “of everything that happens across the whole forward rim of the Past”8.  (Here 
we are to imagine the Past as “a great sort of container ... which grows moment by 
moment longer in the forward direction” 9 as time passes.)  Danto does not deny that this 
Ideal Chronicle can be of help to the historian.  But he thinks it is insufficient to yield 
historical knowledge of the events that form the historian’s concern.  
I would like to raise a question about the extent to which the Ideal Chronicle can 
be of help to the historian.  Doing so will enable me to bring into focus one of Danto’s 
most important, and most neglected, contributions, not only to the philosophy of history, 
but also to the philosophy of action.10    
It seems that the invocation of the Ideal Chronicle misfires.  Danto seems to 
assume that each narrative sentence is about an event mentioned in the Chronicle, but 
refers to an event in the future of this event that is not mentioned in the Chronicle.  But 
although that is possible, it is not necessary.  A narrative sentence might be about an 
event mentioned in the Chronicle, and refer to an event in its future that is also mentioned 
in the Chronicle.  We might put the point by saying that it is not true that the Chronicle 
does not contain knowledge of the future if the future in question is the future of almost 
all the events the figure in the Chronicle.  The only events of whose future the Chronicle 
is ignorant are – as it were – those located on the Past’s forward rim.  And there is no 
reason to think that every narrative sentence must refer to an event beyond that rim.  So, 
we have as yet no reason to think the Chronicle cannot provide a basis for claims made 
by means of narrative sentences, and in that way yield historical knowledge.   
However, it remains the case that there are no narrative sentences in the Ideal 
Chronicle itself.  And that leads Danto to ask whether the Chronicle is so much as able to 
contain descriptions of events of the sort that interest the historian.  That is a pressing 
                                                 
7 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 151.  Danto sometimes talks of an Ideal Chronicler (for reasons that 
will shortly become clear).  But the crucial thing about the Ideal Chronicler is that he is – merely – an ideal 
witness.     
8 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 149.  
9 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 146.  
10 Danto’s other contributions to the philosophy of action are to be found in his Analytical Philosophy of 
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).   
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question, for two reasons.  First, if it is unable to do so, the Ideal Chronicle promises to 
be of no real help to the historian.  Second, it looks as if it is a very real possibility that it 
is unable to do so, as Danto notes.  
 
Narrative sentences refer to at least two time-separated events, and describe the earlier 
event.  But in a sense this structure is exhibited in a whole class of sentences used to 
describe actions.11
 
And actions are surely events of a sort that interest historians.   
‘NN rang the bell’ seems to be a representative example of a sentence that can be 
used to describe actions.  It also seems to be an example of a sentence that exhibits the 
structure Danto has in mind.  The following seems to be true of this sentence.  First, its 
truth turns on the occurrence of a particular event, viz. a ringing of the bell; an event to 
which it may thereby be said to refer.  Second, its truth also turns on whether this 
particular event causes an event in its future, viz. the bell’s ringing; an event to which it 
may thereby also be said to refer.12  So, it seems as if its truth turns on whether the earlier 
of the two events to which it refers causes the later of the two events.13  In other words, it 
seems as if it is a – covert – narrative sentence, and, as such, excluded from the Ideal 
Chronicle.  Must every sentence suitable for describing action suffer this fate?  
Danto thinks not.  He thinks that at least some actions can be described by non-
narrative sentences.  He reasons as follows. 
‘NN rang the bell’ says what NN has done.  But ‘NN is ringing the bell’ says what 
NN is doing.  And it is possible to say truly that someone is doing something even though 
it is not, and will not be, possible to say truly that she has done it.  ‘NN is ringing a bell’ 
seems not to exhibit this structure.  But consider a sentence describing a more creative, 
                                                 
11 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 159.   
12 Of course this is not an uncontroversial notion of reference.  But it seems as if the position under 
discussion needs it, or something like it, if it is to make good on its claim that sentences descriptive of 
action are narrative sentences.   
13 No doubt it is an analytic truth that if there is a ringing of the bell then there is the bell’s ringing.  But 
Davidson has taught us that that is no obstacle to the first’s event’s being a cause of the second.  And his 
case seems to turn on the fact that the former event satisfies at least one another description that cannot be 
pressed into such a truth; ‘a pulling of the cord’, for example.  (It may be true that if there is a pulling of the 
cord then there is a ringing of the bell.  But it cannot be an analytic truth.)  See Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes’ (1963), in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001).     
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less punctuate, exercise of agency – ‘NN is writing a book’, or ‘NN is baking a cake’; a 
sentence in the so-called present progressive tense.  It may be true to say that NN is 
writing a book, even though no particular book emerges as a result of her writing 
(perhaps because she suffers writer’s block at some point in the writing process).  
Exercises of agency are not special in this regard: it may be true to say of a tree that it is 
falling to the ground even though the tree does not fall to the ground (perhaps because 
someone catches it at some point in the falling process). 
We might try to understand sentences such as ‘NN is writing a book’ on the 
model of sentences such as ‘NN rang the bell’.  But if we do we need to ask: what is the 
event that ‘NN is writing a book’ describes, and what is the particular event in its future 
that it causes?  Perhaps we can say that the former is: a writing of a book.  But are we to 
speak of the event of a book’s being written in order to capture the latter – as if events 
can consist simply in something’s instantiating a certain property?14  Or are we to insist 
that events must involve changes in the properties of things, and proceed to describe the 
latter event by speaking of a book’s getting, or becoming, written?   
Each suggestion looks hopeless in the light of the phenomenon we have just 
noted.  A thing can be the subject of a particular event only if the thing in question is, or 
perhaps has been, in existence.  So, there can be a particular event whose subject is a 
book only if the book in question is, or perhaps has been, in existence.  And so, to say 
that the truth of ‘NN is writing a book’ turns on the occurrence of an event whose subject 
is a book is to say that its truth turns on the existence of a particular book.  But, as we 
have seen, its truth does not turn on the existence of a particular book.  So, the model 
breaks down at this point.  And with its demise goes the demise of our attempt to press 
every description of action into the form of a narrative sentence.  Or so Danto assumes.     
 It seems to me that Danto makes a persuasive case for his claim that not all 
sentences descriptive of action are narrative sentences.  But it does not follow that the 
Ideal Chronicle is thereby shown to be an aid to help historians.  And this is because the 
worry that the Chronicle lacks the resources to describe action remains.   
                                                 
14 Of course some philosophers once thought they could so consist.  For a good overview and critique of the 
relevant literature, see Helen Steward, The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007).   
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In this paper, I have spoken of events such as a ringing of the bell.  I have also 
said such things as: NN is ringing a bell.  We may surely say that both of these ways of 
speaking are ways of describing action.  But it is not clear that they are equivalent.  The 
following has been suggested: just as it can be true that NN is writing a book without it 
being true that there is a book b such that NN wrote b, so it can be true that NN is writing 
a book without it being true that there is an action – in the sense of a particular event – of 
writing a book a such that NN engaged in a.  Of course, if NN is writing a book then NN 
is executing an action of writing a book.  But just as it does not follow from this that there 
is a particular book such that NN has written that, so it does not follow that there is a 
particular action of writing a book such that NN has executed that.  One can be writing a 
book even though a particular book does not emerge from the process.  In the same way, 
one can be executing an action even though a particular action does not emerge from the 
process.  As we might put it: just as books do not enter the world until they are completed 
(viz. written), so actions do not enter the world until they are completed (viz. executed).   
I cannot pretend that this argument is conclusive.15  But it is at least suggestive, 
and if it is sound it shows that there are at least some descriptions of action – some 
descriptions to the effect that someone is doing something – that do not refer to a 
particular event.  There are, as it were, some descriptions of action in execution that are 
not descriptions of executed actions.  So, we may say that, if the argument is sound, then 
there are some descriptions of action that cannot figure in the Ideal Chronicle – not 
because the Chronicle cannot make use of narrative sentences, but because it can only 
make use of sentences that describe particular events.  And yet, it seems it cannot make 
use of sentences that describe particular events where these events are actions, precisely 
because such sentences – sentences such as ‘NN wrote the book’, and ‘NN rang the bell’ 
– are, surely, narrative sentences (of the sort exposed seven paragraphs back).   
The upshot is that the Chronicle cannot contain sentences descriptive of action.  
The irony is that the very sentences that Danto hoped could save the Chronicle from 
                                                 
15 It is not my argument; it is Michael Thompson’s.  See his ‘Naïve Action Theory’, in his Life and Form 
(forthcoming).  Thompson’s paper is but one of a number of recent attempts to come to terms with the 
significance of the progressive for our thinking about action.  Other examples include: Kevin Falvey, 
‘Knowledge in Intention’, Philosophical Studies, vol. 99, no. 1 (2000), pp. 21-44; and John McDowell, 
‘Intention in Action’, Howison Lecture U.C. Berkeley (2006). Each of these philosophers is following a 
path that Danto traced for us back in 1968.   
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being of no use to historians – viz. sentences in the progressive – serve, if this argument 
is right, not to save the Chronicle from being useless, but to secure its uselessness, in the 
present regard.     
Even though I have sought to question one of Danto’s assumptions regarding the 
Ideal Chronicle, I hope it is clear that my way of doing so emerges from his own path-
breaking, and insufficiently appreciated, emphasis on the significance of the progressive.  
I have passed over many of the interesting things Danto has to say on this matter, and 
only focussed on those aspects of his writings on the progressive that shed light on our 
central topic; viz. the scope and significance of narrative sentences for our understanding 
of historical knowledge.   
 
 
4.  The point of Danto’s characterisation of historical knowledge in terms of 
narrative sentences is to provide a foundation for his attack on the possibility of historical 
foreknowledge – the putative historical knowledge that substantive philosophers of 
history take themselves to unearth.   
As we have seen, Danto thinks it a condition of the possibility of historical 
knowledge that it is acquired from a standpoint future to the event it is about (in Danto’s 
somewhat technical sense of ‘about’; see §2).   But, according to Danto, the idea of 
historical foreknowledge is the idea of historical knowledge that is acquired from a 
standpoint prior to the event it is about.  And that makes it tempting to conclude that 
historical foreknowledge is impossible, precisely because the very idea of such 
knowledge is the idea of historical knowledge shorn of one of its conditions of 
possibility.   
But that conclusion rests on a slide between two different senses of ‘standpoint’.  
To say that historical knowledge can only be acquired from a future standpoint might be 
to say that it must involve knowledge of what happens in the future of the event it is 
about.  But it might also be to say that it can only acquired by someone whose present 
historical location is in the future of the event it is about.  The proponent of historical 
foreknowledge acknowledges the need for the future standpoint in the first sense.  But 
she denies the need for the future standpoint in the second sense.  To have a case against 
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the substantive philosophy of history, Danto needs to establish that historical 
foreknowledge demands a future standpoint not only in the first sense, but in the second 
sense as well.  And for that a new argument is needed.  
As far as I can see, Danto thinks he has not one, but two arguments which 
establish this conclusion.   
 
 
5.  The first argument is simple to describe, but hard to accept.   
According to Danto, the assumption that historical foreknowledge is possible is 
inconsistent with “our common way of viewing time, truth, and the world”.16  Consider 
some arbitrary person who possesses putative historical foreknowledge that P.  Two 
things are true of this person.  First, the proposition that forms the content of her putative 
historical knowledge refers to an event future to the event it is about.  Second, both this 
future event and the event the proposition is about are future to the present historical 
location of the person in question.  But according to what Danto considers “our common 
way of viewing time, truth, and the world”, a proposition that makes reference to 
something future to the present historical location of the person who entertains the 
proposition cannot be true.  So, the propositional content of the person’s putative 
historical foreknowledge that P cannot be true.  But someone knows that P only if P is 
true.  So, the person cannot possess historical foreknowledge that P.  It follows that 
historical foreknowledge is impossible, because there is nothing special about the person 
in question.   
That is a striking argument.  At its heart is the claim that future-referring 
propositions cannot be true.  Danto does not so much argue for this claim as commend it 
to us as part of “our common way of viewing time, truth, and the world”.  His 
commendation rests on the assumption that there are not simply tensed sentences but also 
tensed propositions.  Past-referring propositions in the past tense, and present-referring 
propositions in the present tense, can be true or false.  <Argentina are invading the 
Falkland Islands> is true when the invasion is happening, and false at any other time.  
<Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands> is true when the invasion has happened, and 
                                                 
16 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 194.  
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false at any other time.  But future-referring propositions in the future tense cannot be 
true.  <Argentina will invade the Falkland Islands> is false when the invasion has 
happened or is happening, and neither true nor false at any other time.   
Danto’s assumption that propositions are tensed is highly controversial.  Some 
sentences are tensed, of course.17  But – we might think – propositions themselves are 
tense-free, even when they are expressed by tensed sentences.  The future tense sentence 
‘Argentina will invade the Falkland Islands’, uttered on the 10th December 1980 
expresses the tense-free proposition <Argentina invades the Falkland Islands at some 
time after 10th December 1980>, for example.  Short of that assumption – for which 
Danto does not argue – it is not open to us to think that future-referring propositions are 
in the future tense, and so as yet not closed to us to think that future-referring 
propositions can be true.      
Danto’s first argument is, then, at best incomplete.  But this need not matter, 
because Danto has another argument against the possibility of historical foreknowledge 
which is indifferent to the supposedly tensed character of future-referring propositions.   
 
 
6.  The second argument is also easy to describe.  And it is reasonably easy to 
accept – when suitably reconstructed.  We have historical foreknowledge only if we 
“know what the historians of the future are going to say”18.  But we do not know what the 
historians of the future are going to say.  Therefore, we do not have historical 
foreknowledge.   
The propositional contents of historical knowledge – what we might call historical 
propositions – are expressed in true narrative sentences.  But not just any true narrative 
sentence will serve to express a historical proposition.  Historical knowledge is 
knowledge of the historical significance of events.  A narrative sentence expresses a 
historical proposition if, and only if, it displays the historical significance of the event it 
                                                 
17 Lydia Goehr makes much of the importance of this point for Danto’s arguments.  See Goehr 
‘Afterwords: An Introduction to Arthur Danto’s Narration and Knowledge (including his Analytical 
Philosophy of History), in Danto, Narration and Knowledge.  But because Danto’s concern is historical 
knowledge and historical representation, he needs to claim that his first argument applies to propositions as 
well as to sentences, and that is a distinct point.    
18 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 180.  
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is about.  And it does this if, and only if, it relates the event in question to an event in its 
future in which historians of the future are interested, in their capacity as historians.  To 
return to our example (see §2): Thatcher’s decision to withdraw the Endurance no doubt 
bears relations to a whole host of future events.  A narrative sentence that records one of 
those relations may not express a historical proposition.  But we might think the narrative 
sentence with which we are concerned – viz. ‘Thatcher’s decision to withdraw the 
Endurance precipitated the Argentine invasion’ – expresses such a proposition, precisely 
because that invasion is an event in which many historians of the future are interested, in 
their official capacity.    
But who are these historians?  For all Danto says, it might be that an event counts 
as one in which historians of the future are suitably interested if, and only if, it suitably 
interests the majority of historians in existence from the point at which the event occurs 
until the end of history.  But then we cannot know the historical significance of an event 
until we know how things stand at the end of history.  And that cannot be Danto’s view, 
because he thinks historical knowledge is in our grasp, even though knowledge of the 
future is not (see §5).  So, perhaps his thought is that the event counts as one in which 
historians of the future are interested if, and only if, it suitably interests the majority of 
historians in existence from the point at which the event occurs until now.  That thought 
ensures there is a hidden parameter in historical knowledge.  Historical knowledge is 
knowledge of the historical significance that an event has at a certain point in time.  At a 
certain point in time, an event has historical significance.  But as time goes on, and 
historians’ interest fades, so does its significance.  An event that was once the object of 
historical knowledge is no longer, not because historians’ beliefs about the event’s 
relations to other events are now false, but because the majority of historians are no 
longer interested in these other events (in their official capacity).   
Let us assume this is what Danto has in mind.  His argument can now proceed as 
follows.  If we have historical foreknowledge, we know what future historians will know 
about what happens to us.  But if we know what future historians will believe about what 
happens to us, we can easily falsify their beliefs about what happens to us.  And if we can 
easily falsify their beliefs about what happens to us, they do not know what happens to 
 12
us.  And so we do not have historical foreknowledge.  Historical foreknowledge is self-
defeating.   
This obscure argument seems to fall at the first premise.  To have historical 
knowledge of events in our future all we need to know is (a) to what events in their future 
they are related, and (b) in what events in their future to which they are related historians 
in their future are interested.  But it does not follow that we need to know about the 
knowledge of future historians.  So long as we have knowledge of (a) and (b), it does not 
matter if future historians are wholly ignorant of the relations between these events.   
It is possible to reconstruct Danto’s argument so that it does not face this hurdle.  
But when we do so we will see that his argument is wholly independent of his conception 
of historical significance.  The argument would go through even if historical 
foreknowledge amounted simply to knowledge of (a).  
The reconstructed argument runs as follows.  We can easily falsify beliefs about 
what happens in the future.19  So, we do not have knowledge of what happens in the 
future.  But we have historical foreknowledge only if we have knowledge of what 
happens in the future.  Therefore, we do not have historical foreknowledge.  
It seems that by ‘we’ Danto means each of us – each human being, or even each 
rational subject.  The argument is evidently unsound, because there are evidently some 
beliefs that I have about what happens in the future that I cannot falsify.  But we can 
further reconstruct the argument so that it avoids this difficulty, as follows.  We can 
easily falsify some of our beliefs about what happens in the future.  So, some of our 
beliefs about what happens in the future do not constitute knowledge about what happens 
in the future.  Therefore, some of our beliefs about what happens in the future do not 
constitute historical foreknowledge.  
It seems to me plausible that this argument is sound.  But something needs to be 
said in defence of the inferential step from its first premise to its interim conclusion.   
The thought underlying this step might be put as follows.  If someone believes 
that a certain event will not occur until a certain point in time, and it is in my power to 
bring this event about whenever I wish, I can ensure that the event occurs at some earlier 
point in time, and thereby ensure that the person’s belief is false.  Of course, if I do 
                                                 
19 That may include historians’ starting to be interested in various events.  But it needs not do so.   
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falsify his belief in this way, his belief does not constitute knowledge.  But even if I do 
not falsify his belief in this way, and even his belief is true, the fact that I am able easily 
to falsify his belief ensures that his belief does not constitute knowledge. 
The correctness of this last claim turns on how we are to understand the idea of a 
belief that I am able easily to falsify.  It is a platitude of contemporary epistemology that 
if a belief constitutes knowledge, then it could not easily be false.20  But a true belief I am 
able easily to falsify is a belief that could easily be false.  Exactly how we are to flesh out 
the idea expressed by the phrase ‘could not easily be false’ is a matter of debate, of 
course.21  But it is surely plausible to suppose that, if I am not merely able to falsify the 
aforementioned belief by ensuring that the relevant event does not happen, but fully 
intend to do so, and yet not do so because I am momentarily distracted, then although the 
belief is true, it could easily be false, and so does not constitute knowledge.   
The soundness of the argument should now be plausible.  It is plausible to think 
there are some propositions about the future that we cannot know.  The exact scope of 
these propositions is not an issue I need to enter here.  But it is unlikely to be especially 
broad.  So, for all Danto’s second argument can mandate, there may events in the future 
of which we have historical foreknowledge.  At best, Danto’s argument exposes, not the 
impossibility, but the limits of the substantive philosophy of history.  
 
 
 7.  Danto does not establish the impossibility of historical foreknowledge.  But he 
may, plausibly, be thought to have shown that there is a limit to what a substantive 
philosophy of history can achieve.  And, in the course of so doing, he succeeds in 
shedding light on that under-appreciated feature of human agency signalled by the fact 
that many of the sentences we use to describe action are in the progressive tense.   
 Of course, Danto wants to do more than this.  He wants to close down the 
substantive philosophy of history, twice over in fact.  And he wants to do so, on each 
occasion, with no more than an a priori argument.  But it seems to me that a better way to 
                                                 
20 To pick an example at random: see Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).   
21 For a recent attempt to flesh out this idea, see Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).   
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tackle claims of such extraordinary epistemological immodesty as claims to historical 
foreknowledge is to ask what possible basis their proponents could have for their claims, 
and then to consider, and if possible reject, suitable candidates for this basis.  That would 
no doubt be a piecemeal, case-by-case affair.  In attempting to establish its impossibility 
in one fell swoop, Danto proves to be almost as immodest as the philosophy against 
which he quite reasonably inveighs.   
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